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| Yoon Suk-joon. |
China's ASEAN policy has to take account individual members' varying diplomatic approaches, geopolitical significance, diverse geographies, political frameworks, military strengths, economic potentials and cultural connections.
The single most important factor is geographic proximity, and in recent years China has dominated the South China Sea (SCS), and the smaller weaker ASEAN countries that border it, to an extent that recalls the Middle Kingdom.
Other countries have also expressed concerns about Chinese expansionism in the SCS, including the U.S., Japan, Australia, India and several European countries.
Since World War II, the U.S. has taken the dominant role in maintaining the balance of power in Asia, both militarily, as the world's foremost maritime power, and geopolitically. For most of this period, China has remained a continental power, significantly weaker than the U.S., and only capable of local power projection, in wars and border clashes with its neighbors.
China's trade with ASEAN comprises sporadic small-scale border exchanges, and for many decades its policy towards ASEAN did not look beyond this. But with its increasing maritime ambitions, the SCS, and hence ASEAN countries, have acquired much greater importance for China.
The 9/11 terror attack and the 2008 global financial crisis are sometimes seen as milestones in the decline of the West, and, by implication, the rise of China. Chinese military expansionism is certainly problematic for ASEAN members, especially for those with territorial claims in the SCS (Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei), but many of them have also benefited greatly from China's economic development.
During the 21st century, China's policy in the SCS has grown ever more assertive, and in the past few years it has effectively militarized the whole region, by transforming a number of uninhabited reefs and shoals in the SCS, creating artificial islands and building military facilities on them.
China has thus restored its historical status as the regional maritime hegemony, and this is already a fait accompli, acknowledged even by the regional U.S. Naval Commander. Yet the SCS contains vital sea lanes of communication, through which $3 trillion of trade passes annually, so the sea-borne trade, not just of ASEAN, but also of the wider world is now subject to Chinese control.
ASEAN does stand to benefit from China's One Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI), which offers huge infrastructural investment and financial aid under the auspices of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This project could transform vast swathes of Eurasia, but ASEAN countries fear that BRI may be a Trojan horse intended primarily to serve Chinese geopolitical ambitions, for example by entrapping the smaller weaker members in debt.
Also, as part of the confusingly named 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, one arm of the BRI, China has begun to develop a true blue-water navy, and is planning to invest vast sums in constructing roads, railways, harbors, dams and energy development, much of which seems tailored to facilitate the projection of China's military power.
All the signs suggest that China intends to impose unilaterally its will in Southeast Asia. Its maritime power will make ASEAN countries toe the line, with economic pressure as a back-up strategy. ASEAN has long been negotiating to establish rules-based institutions to arbitrate disputes with China, but the prospect of securing open and free reciprocal maritime interactions now seems a forlorn hope.
As for the U.S., President Obama's Pivot to Asia was insufficient to reassure ASEAN members, and the current administration seems even less interested in the region. President Trump peremptorily withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, specifically devised to reduce the economic dependence of ASEAN upon China, and although the U.S. recently announced a new Indo-Pacific economic strategy, with an initial investment of $113 million, this trivial sum has not impressed ASEAN members.
The escalating trade war that the U.S. is deliberately provoking with China is also unwelcome. If the U.S. wants to deny China exclusive rights to the Indo-Pacific region, then it needs to demonstrate a robust policy of economic and geopolitical support for Southeast Asia.
In contrast to the American attitude, several other countries are paying more attention to Southeast Asia: Taiwan, India, and South Korea. The Southbound Policy of new Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen emphasizes trade with ASEAN and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
India has also been affected by China's naval expansionism, which threatens to dilute India's established influence in the IOR. India has long had a Look East policy to enhance its strategic relationship with ASEAN, but this has now been upgraded and renamed Act East.
South Korea's President Moon Jae-in is also trying to diversify South Korea's trade relations through his New Southern Policy. The importance of reducing our dependence on China became crystal clear when China reacted to the deployment of the THAAD system, necessary to deter North Korean WMD threats, by imposing harsh sanctions against the South Korean economy.
It is an inescapable fact that ASEAN's geopolitical weakness contrasts sharply with its geographical importance. The ASEAN countries straddle essential trade routes upon which their own, as well as China's prosperity depends.
Despite their weakness, they can perhaps retain some autonomy by closer relations with other middle powers, yet they will remain dominated by China. But China can surely afford to be more magnanimous in its relationship with ASEAN. The BRI offers mutual benefits, for China and ASEAN, but ASEAN countries will embrace Chinese investment more enthusiastically if China makes a clearer separation between its economic and political objectives.
Since 1949, when modern China was established, China has been a continental power, but now it is in the process of becoming a maritime power, whose scale and scope is yet to be determined. This transition will go more smoothly if the other stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific perceive it as a reflection of China's huge population and vibrant economy, rather than as some kind of historical entitlement, as the restoration of the Middle Kingdom.
It seems that China has difficulty understanding that it has more to gain from subtlety and persuasion than from bullying and humiliation, and this is particularly true in its relations with the ASEAN countries, which are very sensitive to such slights: they recall their history in the same way that China recalls its own.
China's ASEAN policy must also take account of the changing role of the U.S., as it competes with China for regional influence, less and less effectively. But the U.S. has long guaranteed maritime security for all the regional stakeholders, including China itself.
Perhaps there will come a time, perhaps quite soon, when other arrangements should be considered to maintain the peace and stability so essential for the vital sea lanes of communication upon which regional, and even global prosperity, depends.
This need not hinder China from treating ASEAN countries more equitably. China's ASEAN policy is clearly a work in progress, but the historical Silk Road was profitable to all involved parties, and there is no reason why the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road should not be just as beneficial for all.
Yoon Suk-joon is a Navy Captain, Republic of Korea Navy (retired), and is a senior fellow of the Korea Institute for Military Affairs (KIMA.)
