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By Oh Young-jin
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| Evans Revere |
1) U.S. confidence shaken by GSOMIA row
2) Supporters of U.S.-ROK alliance win for now
3) U.S. plays reluctant mediator for Korea, Japan
4) Trump sees little need for USFK
5) U.S. should reassure Korea of America's nuclear umbrella
6) U.S. failing to enlist allies on China-containing Indo-Pacific Strategy
Q) How bad has the ROK-U.S. alliance become since the GSOMIA dispute?
A) Seoul's reversal on GSOMIA was an important and necessary step that should limit further damage to the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, considerable damage has already been done because the Blue House (Cheong Wa Dae) had previously flatly rejected the advice and urgent appeals of so many senior U.S. officials, and because Seoul's threat to withdraw from GSOMIA was seen by many in the United States as a rejection of the U.S.-led security trilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia. As a result, Washington's confidence in Seoul has been shaken, and serious questions about the ROK's reliability as an ally and security partner have now arisen.
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| Kim Hyun-chong, left, second deputy of the Cheong Wa Dae National Security Office, speaks to his boss, Chung Eui-yong, the NSO chief. Yonhap |
Q) Is Kim Hyun-chong, a senior Cheong Wa Dae national security official, to blame?
A) There have been reports that some in the ROK government made an ideologically tinged case against GSOMIA, arguing that South Korea should not be a part of a U.S.-led security system that includes Japan, that Seoul needs to demonstrate its independence from the United States on security matters, and that South Korea must resist inclusion in any regional security concept that could be portrayed as anti-China. On the other side was the view that GSOMIA and the trilateral intelligence cooperation it symbolized were essential to Korea's ability to defend itself against North Korea and other security threats.There were clearly divergent views on GSOMIA inside the ROK government, but pragmatism and the need to protect the U.S.-ROK alliance seem to have won the day, at least for now.
Q) If the U.S. has successfully brought Korea and Japan together, would the U.S. be able to patch up Korea-Japan relations the next time around?
A) The United States played a helpful, if low-key, role in bringing about this result. Importantly, however, Seoul's reversal of its decision to withdraw from GSOMIA appears to have been part of a quiet understanding in which Japan has indicated a willingness to reconsider its decision to remove Korea from its export "white list." Seoul's move has stopped the freefall in relations with Japan, and it has opened the way for Japan to take a positive step in mending ties. I am sure that the U.S. is standing by to help in the days to come, but the key actors in this drama are, in fact, Korea and Japan.
Q) How high is the chance of a U.S. withdrawal?
A) It is no secret that President Trump has questioned the rationale for the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. He does not share the view of all his U.S. presidential predecessors about the importance of America's alliances, including the U.S.-ROK alliance. And Trump is deeply wedded to the idea that U.S. allies, including Korea, should "pay" for the defense that U.S. forces provide our allies.
President Trump also appears not to agree that the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Korea is as much in America's interest as it is in Korea's. These views pose a threat to the permanence of the U.S. military presence in Korea and raise questions about the reliability of the U.S. defense commitment to Korea. Together with the excessive and questionable demands being made by the United States in the ongoing SMA negotiations, this has prompted fear that the U.S. might consider scaling back or withdrawing its military presence.
But, despite President Trump's unconventional views about alliances and his evident lack of understanding of the degree to which Seoul contributes significantly to its own defense and to the presence of U.S. forces, the national security and foreign policy elites in both countries remain deeply committed to the alliance and to dealing with the threat posed by North Korea. As President Trump discovered when he sought to abandon America's Kurdish allies in Syria, the U.S. defense, foreign policy, and national security establishment remains a powerful restraint on Trump's whims and prejudices.
Nevertheless, the combination of Trump's anti-alliance views, the excessive demands being made in the SMA (military burden-sharing special measures agreement) negotiations, and the ideological, anti-alliance instincts of some in South Korea represent a potentially toxic mix that could undermine the rationale for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea. This bears careful watching.
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| U.S. President Donald Trump with Apple CEO Tim Cook. AP-Yonhap |
Q) The Trump administration has not made clear that it provides Korea with a nuclear umbrella, basically saying it won't have any beef with North Korea as long as its longer-range missiles won't threaten the U.S. If Korea and Japan push for their own nuclear programs, would the U.S. allow this, or would it share U.S. nuclear arsenals with them?
A) The U.S. remains committed to defending the ROK, including by providing extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. Nevertheless, President Trump's silence when it comes to North Korean missile development and testing is troubling. It would be a terrible mistake for the United States to decouple its security from that of South Korea and Japan by posing no objection to North Korea's development of medium-range missiles that threaten those two countries as long as Pyongyang does not threaten the United States with long-range missiles.
As long as South Korea and Japan have confidence in the U.S. deterrent, there is no reason for either country to have nuclear weapons. A central priority of the United States should be to maintain a high level of confidence in the U.S. deterrent and reassure Seoul and Tokyo that a threat against them by North Korea will be considered a threat against the United States.
Q) How do you see the students' break-in at U.S. ambassador's residence?
A) The assault on the U.S. ambassador's residence was a troubling reminder that there is still a degree of anti-American sentiment in some quarters in South Korea. That sentiment periodically raises its head, including through acts of violence against individual Americans and American institutions. I hope the Korean government will make clear to such groups that actions like this will not be tolerated.
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| President Moon Jae-in talks with Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha. Yonhap |
Q) Is the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific Strategy too small and weak to contain China?
A) The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is, by itself, inadequate to deal with the regional and global challenge being posed by China. The United States needs to ensure that it remains committed to regional and global leadership, to our regional alliances, to multilateralism, to coalition-building, and to the longstanding principles that have provided the foundation for America's moral authority. Unfortunately, under the Trump administration, we have seen an erosion of each one of these traditional elements of U.S. policy. It will be important for the United States to reassert the importance of these elements if we are to deal effectively with China and the other challenges we face.
Q) What are your thoughts about Korea's refusal to join the IPS?
A) Some in the ROK see the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as an effort to mobilize a regional coalition against China ― something that Korea is reluctant to participate in. Many in Korea also see a conflict between participating in a regional concept that may antagonize China and Korea's need to secure Chinese cooperation in dealing with North Korea. In seeking Korea's participation in the strategy, U.S. policymakers will have to make the case to skeptical Koreans that their fears are misplaced. It's not clear that Washington will succeed in doing so.
