Subscribe
E-Paper
 |
| U.S. President Donald Trump meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the truce village of Panmunjeom in the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, June 30, 2019. Reuters-Yonhap |
Moon urged to take path toward confidence building with NK
By Do Je-hae
President Moon Jae-in is facing grave national security and diplomatic challenges this year.
As outlined in his New Year address, he is resolved to push his engagement policy with North Korea despite discontent from the United State.
In particular, Moon will have to better cope with rising concerns about the health of the U.S.-South Korea alliance in his fourth year in office. The alliance has seemed to weaken under his presidency owing to discrepancies on a range of bilateral issues, including North Korea, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and most recently, the controversy over Korea's possible participation in the U.S.-led naval mission in the Strait of Hormuz. Korea and the U.S. are also at odds over the return of contaminated U.S. Forces Korea bases to South Korea; the transfer of wartime operational control of South Korean forces; and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan among other issues.
In the latest sign of a lack of Korea-U.S. coordination, Cheong Wa Dae was reportedly left in the dark about the recent resumption of letter diplomacy between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ahead of Kim's Jan. 8 birthday. This raised speculation that South Korea was being ignored not just by North Korea but also the U.S. in the denuclearization talks.
On top of these problems, President Moon's renewed focus on getting various inter-Korean projects to kick off this year has also triggered concerns that the two allies are not on the same page. Moon is being heavily criticized for his pro-engagement policy amid the uncertainties over North Korea's resolve to take a "new path" this year from its moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests. But some experts say that this concentration on the stabilization of inter-Korean relations is timely and fruitful from a long-term perspective.
In a recent New Year interview with The Korea Times, David Kang, professor at the University of Southern California (USC) and director of the USC Korean Studies Institute, underlined the importance of continuing to focus on ways in which "confidence building and tension reduction can continue between North and South Korea." He also urged South Korea to continue to cooperate with countries such as China and Russia in dealing with the North Korea issue.
The escalating U.S.-China rivalry has put South Korea in a very difficult situation, as seen by the prolonged dispute over the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in Korea that produced a stern backlash from Beijing. The scholar shared some in-depth prospects about Korea's diplomacy in coping with these regional challenges.
The following are edited questions and answers from a written interview with Prof. Kang.
 |
| David C. Kang, professor at the University of Southern California (USC) and director of the USC Korean Studies Institute / Courtesy of David Kang |
A: If North Korea tests another ICBM or other provocation of that sort, it is quite likely that the U.S. will search for new ways to apply pressure to the North. I myself am not quite sure why North Korea has a self-imposed deadline for progress with the U.S. To me, Pyongyang has a lot to gain simply by waiting and not stepping up pressure. It seems counterproductive for Pyongyang to raise tensions, just when the U.S. appears content to let the situation ride for the moment. That being said, given that the current U.S.-DPRK relationship is really about the relationship between two leaders, there is the chance that something could happen between the two leaders to open up a path for another summit or further negotiations.
However, I'm not hopeful at this time, because I think both sides have settled into what is, unfortunately, their historical pattern: the U.S. expecting North Korea to make major moves to denuclearization first, before offering anything in return; and North Korea expecting the U.S. to make major moves toward reassuring or reducing pressure first, before the North has to move. So both sides are essentially now back to where they were historically, saying "you go first."
Q: Is there anything President Moon can do to salvage the U.S.-North Korea talks?
A: The Moon administration's best path forward is to continue to focus on ways in which confidence building and tension reduction can continue between North and South Korea; to stabilize the relationship below the level of "dramatic actions." It is smaller and less visible, but this type of stabilization of the North-South relationship can pay big dividends.
After all, much of the actual violence that has occurred in the past few decades has not been over nuclear weapons or missile launches, but disputes over the Northern Limit Line and at the demilitarized zone (DMZ). To remove those as tension points is a major step forward, and this should be continued. The Moon administration can also find ways to cooperate with China and Russia on North Korea ― these two countries appear more interested in engagement and diplomacy than the U.S. at the moment.
Certainly, both China and Russia explored the possibility of sanctions relief in the U.N. recently. If the Moon administration can find ways to work with them on economic or social engagement of the North, this might have slow, long-term impact. After all, North Korea is a country beyond simply its nuclear weapons and missile programs. To slowly change the country's economy, and to help open up the North to outside influences, can only help move the DPRK toward a slightly less dangerous path than if it were totally isolated. To that end, if there are ways to engage the North without violating the U.N. directives, the Moon administration should explore them.
Concerns over alliance
Q: How do you see the future of the South Korea-U.S. alliance amid the mounting contentious issues?
A: There is tremendous uncertainty in the alliance now, mostly arising from the U.S. side. There are many issues on the table that need to be discussed and resolved. But despite these issues, I am confident the alliance will survive. There have been many issues that have come up over the decades ― from Nixon's shock in the 1970s to the democracy movements of the 80s and 90s ― and the alliance survived them. It will survive these challenges as well, because at its core the alliance is good for Korea and it is good for the U.S. This will take leadership on both sides, but I am confident that a way forward can be found.
Q: What should be Korea's best strategy to handle the complex Special Measures Agreement (SMA) with the U.S.?
A: This is a very delicate matter. On the one hand, it's unprecedented for the U.S. to ask a country to increase its contributions by 400 percent or so. On the other hand, the U.S. has a president who is determined to do so. There is clearly room for some negotiation on this, and whether the actual number increases by 100 percent or 300 percent is less important than establishing some type of framework or understanding between the Moon and Trump administrations for how this relationship will be handled. The Moon administration recently backed down on withdrawing from the intelligence sharing agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, in part as a show of flexibility to both Japan and the U.S. There needs to be some response from the U.S. side ― otherwise, this could be an unraveling of the relationship in ways that are not helpful to either the U.S. or Korea.
 |
| Protesters stage a rally to protest Korea's possible participation in the U.S.-led naval mission in the Strait of Hormuz, in front of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Jan. 10. Yonhap |
Q: The Moon administration has decided to maintain the GSOMIA under the condition that Japan will reconsider its trade restrictions against Korea imposed in August. How do you assess the value of GSOMIA for trilateral security cooperation and should Seoul maintain it regardless of Japan's trade sanctions?
A: For a long time, Korea and Japan kept their issues carefully separated from one another: Historical issues did not impact economic relations; economic relations did not impact political or security relations. The Abe government decided to change that, by responding to developments in historical issues with what are essentially economic sanctions against Korea. The issue of GSOMIA in Korea is politicized, with domestic politics playing as much a role as anything about actual security cooperation. That the Moon administration decided to keep it shows a flexibility and willingness to search for some type of cooperative ways forward with both Japan and the U.S. To me, the real question will be whether the Abe or Trump administrations respond in kind with some type of flexibility of their own. If they do, there is an opportunity to resolve larger issues. If not, we will probably be stuck in this position for a while.
Q: Do you think that the Trump administration should play a bigger role in facilitating reconciliation between Korea and Japan on contentious issues?
A: That would be nice, but the Trump administration has a number of issues facing it. First, there is a staggering number of diplomatic slots in the U.S. State Department. There are so few diplomats that the actual capacity of the U.S. is limited in ways that are unusual. Second, this administration has many other priorities and it's not at all clear that Trump would direct his administration to help find a solution or a way forward. That being said, active U.S. leadership would be welcome, but I sense this is probably unlikely at the moment.
 |
| President Moon Jae-in leaves Beijing after a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Dec. 23, 2019. Courtesy of Cheong Wa Dae |
Responding to China's rise
Q: How do you see Korea's role in Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy, aimed at containing China's rise in the region?
A: One thing that is clear across East Asia is that few countries want greater U.S.-China tension. Almost every country in the region wants good relations with both China and the U.S., and few countries want to pick sides. Even Japan ― usually considered the most skeptical of China in the region ― has sought ways to find a cooperative relationship with China, including Abe's upcoming visit to Beijing. So Korea for its part shares some, but not all, American priorities regarding China. To that end, regional states can help ameliorate the larger tensions by finding ways to cooperate with both Beijing and Washington.
