The redacted copies of Sue Mi Terry's handwritten notes she brought from a private meeting between the U.S. secreatary of state and five Korea experts, including Terry, held on or around June 17, 2022 in the department's building in Washington D.C. Yonhap

A question has remained unanswered regarding the U.S. prosecution's indictment of Sue Mi Terry for her alleged role as an unregistered agent for South Korea.

How did the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtain the two photos that captured notes taken by Terry during, or prior to, the private and undisclosed meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State, senior State Department staff, and five Korea experts, including Terry, held on June 22, 2022, at the State Department building?

Those two photos were taken by an unnamed South Korean intelligence officer working with the National Intelligence Service (NIS) identified as the "NIS handler-3" in the indictment document.

According to the U.S. Attorney's Office, NIS handler-3 took the photos of the two-page notes with his smartphone in a car with diplomatic license plates registered to the South Korean embassy in Washington D.C. after the private meeting. The redacted copies of those photos were included in the indictment document.

The U.S. Attorney's Office presented the photos as evidence supporting the allegations that Terry worked for the South Korean government without registering as a foreign agent, claiming she violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Terry, however, denied the allegations. In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo, Terry's attorney claimed that she wrote the notes "before" attending the meeting and that they were about her "talking points," not what she wrote during the private meeting with the U.S. secretary of state.

The timing of when the notes were taken appears to be a critical factor in determining Terry's motive. If the notes were written before the meeting and included her talking points, as Terry claimed, it would weaken the allegation that she shared undisclosed information about the U.S. government with South Korean intelligence officials. However, if the notes were made during the meeting and summarized what was discussed, which was expected to be off-the-record, it would raise suspicions about Terry's motive.

Another critical issue that needs to be clarified to assess how the Sue Mi Terry indictment will affect South Korea and its intelligence community is how the FBI obtained the photos. Were they taken by FBI agents or secret agents working with U.S. intelligence agencies? Or did the FBI acquire them from sources outside the U.S. government?

These questions have been raised because the indictment document did not specify the source of the photos.

In South Korea, the "missing photo credit" has sparked a heated debate about the sources of those pictures. Pundits argue that if individuals outside the U.S. government were involved in the FBI's acquisition of the photos, it could have a significant impact on South Korea's intelligence community.

Opinions are divided about the sources, and two schools of thought present different interpretations about the missing photo credit and its potential impact on the NIS.

Rep. Park Sun-won of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) claimed that the photos likely resulted from the FBI's cyber activities.

"If true, this is a serious issue," he said during a KBS radio show on July 19. "(As stated in the indictment document), those photos were taken by an NIS agent and stored on his smartphone. The fact that the FBI secured that secret information which was on the NIS agent's smartphone could indicate that information about all NIS agents and South Korean diplomats based in the U.S. and their smartphones were compromised."

Park had worked for four years at the National Intelligence Service (NIS) under three different roles during the previous Moon Jae-in administration. He initially joined the NIS as a foreign policy and security advisor to then-NIS Director Seo Hoon. He was later promoted to deputy director, overseeing planning and coordination, and ultimately served as first vice director in charge of overseas operations before leaving the NIS.

Inside the National Assembly, Rep. Park is concurrently serving as a member of two committees, the National Assembly National Defense Committee and Intelligence Committee.

He was elected in Incheon's Bupyeong B electoral district on the DPK's ticket at the National Assembly elections held in April.

Sue Mi Terry, left, and an intelligence officer identified as "NIS handler-3" in the indictment document walk toward a car with diplomatic license plates registered to South Korean embassy in Washington D.C. after shopping a Louis Vitton handbag in a store in Washington D.C. on April 16, 2021. Yonhap

NIS moles?

While the DPK lawmaker suggested that the FBI's cyber surveillance might be the source of Terry's photographed notes, another intelligence expert, who previously worked at the NIS for 20 years, said the possibility of intentional insider information being leaked to the FBI cannot be ruled out.

Choe Su-yong, a former NIS agent who worked on covert operations about North Korea, alleged that the photos of Terry's handwritten notes could have been passed to the FBI by a "double agent" inside the NIS.

"I believe it could have been an act of a mole inside the NIS," he told The Korea Times. Moles are espionage agents who infiltrate a target intelligence agency with the objective of selling its secrets from within to a foreign intelligence agency.

As seen in the intelligence agencies of other countries, Choe alleged that there are almost certainly moles within the NIS.

Choe claimed that moles are working for foreign intelligence agencies and this time, it could be the one operated by North Korea. He added the indictment of Sue Mi Terry might have been the result of a covert operation by North Korea sympathizers from within.

Even if the allegation is true, a question remains unanswered: For what purposes would the moles engage in such activities? In other words, how could North Korea benefit from the Terry indictment?

Choe said North Korea would certainly benefit if its harsh critic, Terry, was removed.

Some intelligence experts shared a view similar to Choe's regarding the possible existence of moles within the NIS.

"Beyond Utopia" film poster

Citing a source with insider knowledge of North Korea, Choe said Terry became a prime target for removal after the release of the 2023 documentary film "Beyond Utopia." The film, which features Terry, depicts the perilous journeys of North Korean escapees, highlighting the harsh living conditions and severe human rights abuses they face.

"I heard that the film infuriated North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and he directed his deputies to do whatever they can to remove Terry," Choe said.

In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, several unnamed sources suggested that the NIS may be seeking to identify the mole from within to determine if any insiders leaked related intelligence to foreign governments. One unnamed source was quoted as saying, "When an agent's covert operation is exposed to a foreign country, intelligence agencies typically conduct an internal investigation to detect if anyone from within assisted in leaking information. The NIS would follow the same protocol, as searching for moles is a standard procedure in such situations."

If their allegation is proven true, the NIS, already under pressure to reform, will face even greater demands for transformation. This will likely lead to significant reshuffles within the agency.

Rumors are circulating due to the missing photo credits in Terry's photographed notes, following media reports about her indictment for violations of the FARA.

In the indictment document, the U.S. Attorney's Office said that the NIS official identified as handler-3 photographed two pages of handwritten notes that Terry brought from her meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State.

"The notes were written on the letterhead of Think Tank-2 where Terry had recently worked," it said, presenting redacted copies of the photos. The attorney's office did not specify the source of those photos.

Other photos included in the indictment document have clear origins, as specified by the attorney's office. For example, the photos showing NIS handlers 2 and 3 purchasing luxury bags were accompanied by a disclaimer indicating that the images were sourced from the stores' respective surveillance cameras.

There is one more photo for which the U.S. Attorney's Office did not clarify the source. It features Terry dining with NIS handler-2 and his successor, NIS handler-3, at a Greek restaurant in Manhattan in August 2022. Unlike the other photos included in the document, this image lacks specific information about the date it was taken.