By Stephen Costello
After almost two years of extreme efforts and remarkable diplomatic and bureaucratic coordination, many lessons must have been learned and much capacity must have been created in the Moon Jae-in government.
Although there is still plenty to do, it is simply inaccurate today to say that in terms of diplomatic power South Korea is a "shrimp among whales." Perhaps it is now more of a dolphin among sharks, but we should probably abandon this analogy before it's too late.
Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha's quoted remarks are particularly relevant to today's strategic moment. An AP story characterizes her points this way: "Proposed new talks would help settle differences over how much sanctions relief Washington should provide North Korea in exchange for nuclear disarmament steps."
This is precisely what Seoul, and only Seoul, can do now. It also gets at the mystery that may never be solved regarding the negotiating positions in Hanoi one week ago. Did the Americans ever propose to lift those four or five critical U.N. sanctions in return for denuclearization steps that were realistic and appropriate?
News reports in the New York Times and other publications have not revealed the answer, and no reporter has asked President Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Adviser John Bolton, or others. Given the ongoing chaos within the U.S. administration, and self-imposed limitations on journalists, we are unlikely to find out.
This is where the Seoul administration's role is unique. Senior officials there know far more about the detailed positions of the U.S. and DPRK teams than we outsiders do. They are also a trusted, non-ideological and professional voice on these issues at a critical time.
The Hanoi meeting can be judged as the demonstration of Seoul's maximum patience with the two other protagonists, and a demonstration that those two are still unable to reach the critical deal.
We have no idea whether the new three-party talks will materialize, or whether Seoul would be successful in driving everyone toward a good initial deal. But this is exactly where the South Korean government should be right now. Its interest in North Korea's verified and significant actions toward denuclearization, and its interest in the lifting of crucial U.N. sanctions on North Korea, are absolute. There is clearly a deal to be made.
Among the questions that might be explored are these: Could the North agree to a verified freeze on the production of all fissile material, in exchange for relief (perhaps with a snap-back option) of those important five U.N. sanctions? If the North added to this a formal, written agreement to freeze testing of all ICBM missiles or components, would that be acceptable to both? How about if four instead of five sanctions are lifted?
Other items could be added by either side to enhance the deal, such as an end-of-war declaration, exchange of liaison offices, humanitarian and travel agreements, etc. But partial U.N. sanctions relief for verified freezes on fissile material and ICBMs would be the central exchange.
The new initiative that has been hinted at could be a medium- and long-term project, because it seems to accept the one central fact of the North Korea questions: Significant and trustworthy sanctions relief is the only basis on which DPRK denuclearization and capability degradation can occur.
If the determination, among the North's neighbors and international actors, to cap and roll back its nuclear and missile abilities can be satisfied, then partial-but-significant U.N. sanctions relief should be the exchange. All serious experts would likely agree to this.
U.S. economic promises, multiple "waivers" at the U.N. 1718 Sanctions Committee, and other unilateral or bilateral items would be insufficient. It is just as questionable whether the U.S. or North Korea would accept these proposed deals.
But they are what should have been on the table, beginning over a year ago. It is not clear that they were ever on the table in Hanoi. Now it is time to find out, and Seoul is the only one who can mediate.
Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) managed the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation Washington office in the 1990s. He directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council there from 1999 to 2004. He now directs AsiaEast.Org, a policy initiative focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington and Seoul.