| North Korea fires a ground launch tactical missile, Jan. 27. The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the two missiles hit their targets precisely. The North conducted seven missile launches, including the test-firing of what it claimed were as hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), in January alone, heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Yonhap |
Runaway nuclear ambition will derail Kim Jong-un's future
By Yun Byung-se
The year 1994 was special for nuclear diplomacy. In October 1994, the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework to resolve the first North Korean nuclear crisis was signed in Geneva after 18 months of negotiations. Two months later, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances was signed by Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The background and rationale for these two agreements are quite different, but they shared some common characteristics.
First, Ukraine, nuclear weapon state at that time with the third-largest nuclear arsenal, acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the DPRK, which had announced in 1993 its withdrawal for the first time in NPT history, decided to remain a party to the treaty (until 2003). Ukraine transferred some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads (and earlier an additional 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons) to Russia. North Korea undertook a freeze and pledged to dismantle its nuclear facilities.
Second, security assurances were formally provided to both countries. Washington assured Pyongyang against the threat or use of its nuclear weapons. The scope of the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994 is much more broad and specific. It includes respecting Ukrainian independence and sovereignty in the country's existing borders; refraining from the threat or use of not just nuclear arms but economic pressure as well; taking immediate U.N. Security Council action to provide assistance if Ukraine “should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”
Naturally, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 caught Ukraine off guard. Should there be any forceful change to Ukraine's independence and sovereignty, that will be a formal death sentence to whatever is left of the Budapest Memorandum.
Third, both were given compensation and assistance for abandoning their nuclear assets. Russia provided Ukraine with fuel rods for civilian nuclear power plants and the U.S. spent many hundreds of millions of dollars to assist Ukraine's denuclearization under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the historic Nunn-Lugar Act.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and like-minded countries undertook providing the DPRK with heavy oil for heating and electricity production pending the completion of the first light-water reactor (LWR). The LWR project was suspended in 2003 as North Korea's clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) program was revealed in 2002.
The commonalities stop here and the irony of history plays out. After 30 years, a cloud of war between the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum is gathering along the Ukraine-Russian border.
North Korea, who violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and other follow-up agreements, including the 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement, is threatening to wield its nuclear sword not only on its neighbors but also on the international community as a whole. According to a RAND Corporation-Asan Institute for Policy Studies report released last April, North Korea is estimated to possess 151 to 242 nuclear weapons by 2027 ― on par with the current nuclear arsenal of the U.K.
If Russia tramples on the Budapest Memorandum and the U.N. Charter, the consequences will not be confined to Eastern Europe, but will be far-reaching and across the board.
Among other things, such actions will vindicate Kim Jong-un's all-in bet on nuclear armament over the last decade. He must be ridiculing the Ukrainian leader who relinquished around 4,000 nukes, as his father did several times on the fate of the leaders of Iraq and Libya.
Since early this year, Kim has engaged in unprecedented serial missile provocations with impunity, exploiting the powerless and hopeless state of the U.N. Security Council. China's blocking power, combined with Russia's support due to the Ukraine crisis, will give Pyongyang a double free pass for nuclear armament and proliferation.
This situation is why eight U.N. Security Council ambassadors and Japanese ambassador, shamefully without South Korean presence again, warned in a joint press conference two weeks ago that inaction by the Council will embolden Kim Jong-un to go further.
First, Kim will quite likely cross the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing since 2018. The latest testing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Jan. 30 is regarded by many as a precursor to that possibility. The end of the moratorium will effectively mean a return to the pre-2018 state of confrontation. Even President Moon Jae-in has warned that North Korea has inched closer to this possibility.
It will turn Moon's flagship policy ― the Korean Peninsula Peace Process ― and its offshoot inter-Korean agreements, especially the five year-long quest for the end-of-the-Korean-War declaration, into potential casualties.
Secondly, with or without the breach of the moratorium, Pyongyang will become a constant existential threat to South Korea, Japan and now the U.S., like the Sword of Damocles. Like it or not, U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and next president of South Korea should be prepared for such a nightmarish scenario.
Under these circumstances, what the U.S. and its NATO allies are going to do to help Ukraine in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum and other commitments, will be watched closely not just by China and North Korea, but also by the U.S.' allies and partners, NPT parties and nuclear threshold countries around the world, including Taiwan.
Back in 1994, The New York Times noted regarding the U.S.' security assurances to Ukraine, “These promises could inject the United States into the middle of a Russian-Ukrainian crisis with America risking the safety of New York or Washington to protect Kiev.” Ever since, controversies have been ongoing as to the nature of the U.S.' obligations ― whether it is security guarantees (like NATO) or security assurances.
Nevertheless, it is encouraging to hear that the Biden administration has reiterated America's unwavering support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity on several occasions and is working to follow up this commitment with actions.
The right strategy for peace and honor should be to let rule-breakers know that miscalculation will come with an unbearably high price tag. It should make them ― not the rule-abiders ― sleepless and blink first. Otherwise, a geopolitical Pandora's Box will open up, releasing all kinds of trouble.
Yun Byung-se is the former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of the Korea Peace Foundation and a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council, as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
US engagement with N. Korea in line with its national interest
By Yang Moo-jin
On Jan. 30, concerns were raised over the likelihood of North Korea's review to end its moratorium on nuclear and ICBM launches in the not-too-distant future, as North Korea launched a Hwaseong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) after nearly four years and four months.
The Biden administration responded in a way which is different from the Trump administration, which turned a blind eye to North Korea's short-range missile launches. Denouncing North Korea's missile launches, the Biden administration noted that they were in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions and maintained that the United States would like to resolve the issue through dialogue and diplomacy, while responding to such action by convening the U.N. Security Council meetings and imposing additional unilateral sanctions.
North Korea, on the other hand, emphasizes that their missile development is a normal activity for its self-defense. North Korea claims that it is a project to bolster its defense capabilities in accordance with its own plan ― not a show of force to attract someone's attention. Therefore, I would like to review some options for North Korea policy and scenarios that the U.S. can choose going forward under the difficult circumstances to narrow the differences between North Korea and the U.S. in their perspectives.
The first option is to impose sanctions and pressure to urge North Korea to choose denuclearization by causing pain and bringing disadvantages to North Korea for its nuclear and missile development. However, it is hard to expect additional sanctions resolutions to be adopted at the U.N. Security Council unless North Korea really launches ICBMs or nuclear tests. It is going to be less likely that China and Russia cooperate with the U.S. amid the heightening competition and conflict between the U.S. and China and between the U.S. and Russia.
If the adoption of a new U.N. Security Council resolution on North Korea is far-fetched, the U.S. is able to move forward with its unilateral sanctions. But North Korea has lived with its so-called “self-imposed sanctions” over the last two years, after it shut down its borders due to COVID-19. Even if additional sanctions are imposed, it will only be merely symbolic and the impact on North Korea will not be significant.
Military options against North Korea, such as the resumption of large-scale ROK-U.S. combined military exercises and the deployment of additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, could be put on the table for discussion.
However, such military pressure on North Korea could result in a vicious cycle that causes new military provocations by North Korea, and accidental military clashes are going to be very likely. Furthermore, some argue for the need to launch a preemptive strike on North Korea, but such a claim cannot be considered a rational choice that we could possibly choose given its escalation risks and potentially enormous damage.
The second option is to resume negotiations with North Korea. After announcing its North Korea policy on April 2021, the Biden administration has offered dialogue without any preconditions. However, North Korea argues that the U.S. hostile policy has not changed and demands the U.S. to withdraw its hostile policy through actions first.
The Biden administration may face political constraints in providing substantive concessions to North Korea prior to dialogue. However if the U.S. continues to shift the blame to North Korea, it will further advance North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, leading to a de facto “strategic patience” policy yet again.
To draw North Korea back to the negotiating table, the U.S. needs to make an offer to rekindle negotiations by revisiting the 2019 Hanoi Summit. When negotiations are resumed, revealing that the U.S. is willing to discuss agenda items of interest to North Korea, including sanctions relief, a security guarantee and a peace regime together with denuclearization, and that corresponding measures in the phased approach toward denuclearization can be adequately considered, will be of great help to the resumption of dialogue. In addition, it is worth considering some confidence-building measures such as humanitarian cooperation and adjustments to the ROK-U.S. combined military exercises.
If the end-of-war declaration that President Moon Jae-in is pushing forward is achieved, it could provide a good opportunity for the U.S. and North Korea to start negotiations on denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula in earnest. An end-of-war declaration has the universal justification to end the abnormal state of armistice which has persisted for the last 69 years on the Korean Peninsula, and is a very useful measure to build confidence between North Korea and the U.S. as part of the withdrawal of its hostile policy, which North Korea demands.
The Biden administration expressed its willingness to find solutions through a calibrated and practical approach by moving away from the Obama administration's “strategic patience” policy and the Trump administration's “grand bargain” approach. If the Biden administration continues to build confidence by sticking to its original stance and knocking down easy tasks in an incremental manner, DPRK-U.S. relations will develop in a way that is different from today.
The U.S.' engagement with North Korea should not be interpreted as the unilateral action of the United States to provide excessive concessions, but rather a strategic decision that is in line with the U.S.' national interest. Should negotiations with North Korea be resumed, North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, as well as nuclear proliferation risks, could be brought under control for the time being.
Moreover, they could facilitate cooperation with China for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which could serve as a foundation for resolving the Sino-American conflict in a rational manner. What is more, stability in Northeast Asia could also contribute to de-escalating the tinderbox of tension between the U.S. and Russia over the Ukraine issue.
Despite heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea's barrage of missile launches, there is still room for dialogue. We should remain steadfast in making progress on the Korean Peninsula Peace Process amid the difficult situation.
Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.kr) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies and vice chairman of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is also a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy consultant at the Ministry of Unification.