Since Kim Jong-un, the autocratic leader of North Korea, met Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, Russia's Far East, last month, many pundits started contending that the Kim-Putin summit implies the North's intention to finally give up its years-long wish ― the normalization of relations with the United States. However, it is unclear whether North Korea's goal to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. is clearly off the table.
To replenish its supplies of ammunition in the prolonged Ukraine War, Moscow is believed to have asked Pyongyang to provide ammunition, and possibly missiles, to accomplish its goal in Ukraine. In exchange for support, Pyongyang might have demanded cash, food and advanced missile technology transfers.
Giving Kim a tour of his country's modern space launch station, Putin promised to help North Korea build satellites. This year, North Korea attempted to send its satellites into orbit in May and August but failed to carry out the mission. Pyongyang publicly announced that it would make a third attempt in October.
Along with this, as North Korean missiles show similarities with Russian designs, it would be alarming to the U.S. and South Korea if Moscow takes steps to help Pyongyang complete its nuclear forces by transferring intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile technologies. Considering Pyongyang's Juche ideology coined by the country's founder Kim Il-sung, however, Moscow will unlikely do so as it eventually will not be able to control Pyongyang's aggression after Kim gains overwhelming power thanks to the missile technology transfer.
Despite Kim's "full and unconditional support" for Putin's "sacred fight" to defend his country's security interests, North Korea would again show up in the nuclear talks with the U.S. when the conditions are met. In other words, North Korea cannot give up its efforts to normalize relations with the U.S. as its economy and pariah status on the international diplomatic stage cannot recover without U.S. support.
Even though most U.S. and South Korean experts distrust Kim's remarks that he can be willing to withdraw his nuclear weapons if the U.S. can guarantee the security of him and his regime, it should be noted that he once schemed to show what scenarios he can accept for the denuclearization of his country.
Ever since the U.S. imposed economic sanctions against North Korea, the first priority Pyongyang has always demanded has been Washington's lifting of the sanctions. During the 2019 Hanoi Summit with then-U.S. President Donald Trump, Kim offered the complete destruction of his country's emblematic Yongbyon Nuclear Complex in exchange for lifting the five main economic sanctions related to civic affairs. This offer was rejected by Trump at that time as he was looking for an "all for all" approach to getting attention from the U.S. media that were covering his former lawyer Michael Cohen's hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Oversight and Accountability. The U.S. Democrats scheduled the testimony on the same day when Trump was negotiating with Kim - which is believed to be one of the reasons for Trump's decision to walk out of the summit meeting with no deal.
As many experts and government officials already know, the "all for all" approach is what Kim cannot pursue as he believes that the U.S. and South Korea would attack his country if he voluntarily gave up his nuclear weapons first. This sentiment prevails in Pyongyang's state-controlled media reports calling the South Korea-U.S. joint military drills "rehearsals for an invasion."
Although China and Russia have backed up North Korea in the U.N. Security Council by blocking the U.S.-led initiatives to impose additional sanctions against North Korea for its long-range ballistic missile launches since last year, their influence to revive the North Korean economy is limited without the U.S. withdrawal of the sanctions against the North. Thus, North Korea cannot fully rely on the support and cooperation of Russia and China as it also knows the vicious cycle of its crippling economy can be broken under the normalization of relations with the U.S. And Kim would know that any growing leverage of pro-China and pro-Russia military elites within North Korea would rather weaken the stability of his regime.
Becoming a contender against the U.S. is not what the North wants to achieve in the foreseeable future. It is also not seeking to make his country an economic superpower to confront China in the region. The priority goal of the North is to be a legitimate nuclear state recognized by the U.S. so that it can become a socialist economic powerhouse in the long run.
Unfortunately, still there are U.S. officials and policymakers with blind faith in the effectiveness of the economic sanctions against North Korea, leading Washington to maintain the devastating sanctions against North Korea even when Kim expressed his willingness to take steps for denuclearization in 2018. The tricky part for Seoul is that the U.S. will unlikely lift the sanctions on North Korea first to boost the diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Unless North Korea dismantles its nuclear arsenals preemptively, no moves by the U.S. on sanctions will be made. As North Korea will also never give up its nuclear weapons first as a friendly gesture toward the U.S., the tug-of-war will last while South Korea has no effective cards for both sides to resolve the security conflicts in the region.
Due to the U.S. and U.N. economic sanctions against North Korea, and South Korea's relations with China and Russia, North Korea cannot give up normalizing ties with the U.S. Cooperating with Russia militarily and forming close ties with China and other anti-U.S. states does not reflect that the North is no longer interested in normalizing relations with the U.S. Although it is understandable that Washington prefers taking a hawkish stance on North Korea due to Pyongyang's unilateral (and repeated) withdrawal and breach of the agreements in the past, it should recalibrate its policy on North Korea by closely working with South Korea to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Starting with diplomatic steps such as ending the 1950-53 Korean War as an impetus to reactivate the stalled nuclear talks, the U.S. administration should devise policies on how to completely dismantle the North Korean nuclear arsenal through a phased denuclearization process.
Refraining from warning Pyongyang repeatedly that its attempt to use nuclear weapons will result in the end of the Kim regime, the U.S. should put itself in North Korean shoes to delve deeper into the deep-rooted security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula caused by the North's growing nuclear capabilities.
Mitch Shin is a young fellow at The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy. Shin was an assistant editor and chief Koreas correspondent for The Diplomat, and a non-resident research fellow at The Institute for Security & Development Policy, Stockholm Korea Center.