Troy Stangarone
For the immediate future, protecting democracy and restoring domestic political stability must be a priority for South Korea. Foreign policy challenges will need to be dealt with after stability has been restored. However, whatever President Yoon Suk Yeol's true motivation, the declaration of martial law could not have been more poorly timed for South Korea's foreign policy interests.
Whether President Yoon survives the current crisis or not, the parallel with the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye is hard to ignore. The impeachment of Park occurred almost eight years ago from the day of the initial impeachment vote against Yoon and also came as South Korea faced uncertainty from an incoming Trump administration in the United States.
Park's impeachment put South Korea at a disadvantage to other U.S. partners and allies. Then-incoming President Donald Trump was new to office and there was uncertainty as to whether he meant what he said on the campaign trail. That allowed creative operators such as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe the opportunity to not only work to woo Trump but also engage with the establishment Republicans set to fill the Trump administration.
In contrast, South Korea went through a leadership void that lasted until Moon Jae-in was sworn in as president in May of 2017. During the critical period of the U.S. presidential transition and the early months of the Trump administration, no South Korean official could credibly engage with the new leadership in Washington.
Prior to Yoon's decision to declare martial law on Dec. 3, South Korea looked better placed to deal with an incoming Trump administration than in 2016. South Korean officials and experts had spent more than a year coming to Washington consulting with experts in the Washington policy community to learn what policies a new Trump administration might pursue and who would be the key players if he were to retake the White House. A better understanding of a second Trump term would allow South Korea to better prepare to navigate policy changes potentially pushed by the Trump administration related to national security and economic cooperation.
Knowing Trump's concerns about U.S. allies, U.S. troop levels, and the amount South Korea contributes to the stationing of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula are potential areas of tension with a second Trump administration. Trump's last secretary of defense, Mark Esper, has suggested that Trump intended to pull all U.S. troops out of South Korea had he won a second term in 2020. During the campaign, he suggested that a decrease in U.S. troops could be under consideration if the “wealthy” South Korea didn't “treat us properly.”
Trump has suggested that South Korea should be paying significantly more for U.S. military support. In an October interview, Trump indicated that South Korea should be paying $10 billion a year for burden sharing — a little less than 10 times what South Korea currently contributes. While South Korea recently reached a new agreement on burden sharing with the Biden administration, the expectation is that Trump will look to reopen that agreement.
Beyond the expected issues of troop levels and burden sharing, South Korea has an important interest in how the war in Ukraine ends. North Korea has likely earned more than $4.3 billion in artillery sales to Russia alone and is benefiting from its relationship with Moscow through sanctions evasion, military technology transfers and practical battlefield experience for its troops.
Trump has indicated that he will pressure Ukraine and Russia to end the war once he's in office. How the war ends and the nature of Russia's relationship with North Korea after the war have direct implications for South Korean national security. With a weakened Yoon or an acting president, South Korea will now have little ability to influence the United States' approach to any conclusion of the war.
The incoming Trump administration has also put forward a range of tariff and regulatory changes that will directly impact South Korean interests. While the proposed 25 percent tariff on Mexico does not directly impact South Korea, it does impact Kia's production of the Forte. The proposed 10 percent tariffs on China will make auto parts exported from China for production in the United States more expensive. These tariffs are separate from Trump's potential 10 to 20 percent universal tariff or changes to the Inflation Reduction Act or CHIPS Act that would directly affect Korean exports and investments.
It is still unclear whether Yoon will survive the current political crisis, but whether he does or Prime Minister Han Duk-soo soon becomes the acting president, neither will be in a position to address the critical foreign policy issues related to Trump's return to office and North Korea's growing relationship with Moscow. Instead, South Korea now finds itself in a similar situation to 2016, except Trump and Kim Jong-un will be better prepared to move forward on their policy preferences while South Korea again faces political uncertainty.
Troy Stangarone is the director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the deputy director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.