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The main source of concern for South Korea is the recent dramatic decline in the domestic consensus over foreign policy. Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea had long enjoyed a robust domestic consensus with regards to foreign policy. This consensus remained even after its transition from an authoritarian to a democratically elected government in the late 1980s.
Throughout the 1990s, South Korea's diplomatic relations flourished on the back of successful consensus-building between the military-backed majority party and two liberal opposition parties. During this period, South Korea diligently pursued "Nordpolitik," normalizing relations with China as well as Russia and other former Eastern Bloc countries. South Korea was also admitted to the United Nations in 1991 when Russia and China decided not to veto its application.
Inter-Korean rapprochement efforts gained momentum under President Kim Dae-jung, who also sought a coalition with a conservative party to build up support for his Sunshine Policy. These efforts eventually ground to a halt due to North Korea's secretive pursuit of nuclear weapons, but that does not take away from the fact that consensus-building played a critical role in pushing them forward.
Growing political polarization in recent years, however, has significantly eroded South Korean society's ability and willingness to build consensus. The two main parties, one liberal and one conservative, put on increasingly polarizing campaigns, as most elections are now decided by very slim margins.
Nonetheless, the winning party behaves as if it has received a mandate from all of the voters, completely disregarding the views of the other half. Such behavior prompts strong pushback from the minority parties at every turn and thereby makes cooperation and compromises impossible to achieve. Foreign policy too has fallen victim to this unfortunate dynamic.
South Korea is smaller and weaker relative to its bigger and more powerful neighbors. Internal division adds another layer of challenge for South Korea, already burdened with an external division at the demarcation line. This double division could bring about diplomatic trouble, posing a serious threat to South Korea's survival and development. It would be hard to expect the neighboring countries to respect the foreign policy choices of a South Korea considerably restricted by the double division. North Korea might underestimate South Korea's resolve to defend against its nuclear brinkmanship.
To avoid this danger, South Korea should learn from West Germany's experience. The first lesson to be learned is how West Germany managed to build a clear consensus vis-a-vis East Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as its Western allies throughout the unification process.
One underappreciated key to success was then-German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's retention of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher through the formation of a coalition government, with the liberal party headed by Genscher. This coalition allowed the Christian Democratic Union, the conservative party headed by Kohl, to coopt the "Ostpolitik" put forth by its rival, the Social Democratic Party, which had been in coalition with Genscher's Free Democratic Party previously, and to take a more balanced approach toward the Eastern Bloc, including East Germany.
The coalition also represented a broad spectrum of political views on crucial diplomatic issues in West Germany. Kohl and Genscher were able to maintain a stable government because of the coalition, the longevity of which, made them Germany's longest serving chancellor and foreign minister, respectively, in recent history.
The Kohl-Genscher coalition successfully built confidence with partners in both the West and the East. This confidence helped Germany maintain stability in the region despite unexpected and turbulent changes unleashed by the sudden collapse of the Cold War structure in the Soviet bloc.
The need for a robust domestic consensus is in fact much greater for South Korea now than in West Germany in the late 1980s for the following three reasons: 1) West Germany was not weaker than its neighbors, while South Korea is in comparison to its neighbors; 2) West Germany's superiority over East Germany in population size and military power was greater than that of South Korea over North Korea; and 3) East Germany was less unpredictable than North Korea is now.
This situation is why restoring the country's consensus-building capacity should be the first and foremost task for the next South Korean president, regardless of who wins the election. Forming a broad-based government should be the way forward. It may look impossible under the current toxic political climate, but we cannot go on in this way. Unless South Korea reverses this dangerous trend, its diplomacy is doomed.
Let us dream the impossible. If we do not even dream, nothing will ever change. By dreaming the impossible, let us have a chance at turning away from the impending doom. With our imagination and common resolve, we may be able to open another booming era of South Korean diplomacy. Whoever wins the forthcoming election must not forget that the other half of the population did not support the winner.
Therefore, it is imperative that the winning party reach out to their opponents to seek a broad-based coalition and widen the domestic support base. Security and foreign policy programs must be crafted through an inclusive process with a coalition of the willing.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as the foreign affairs secretary for the South Korean president. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).
