Subscribe
E-Paper
By Sandip Kumar Mishra
 |
After getting elected, Yoon had a telephone conversation with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison after his talks with U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minster Fumio Kishida and U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
It gave the impression that Yoon is placing priority on Australia. The move was read by many political pundits as his intent to join the Quad. He also spoke on the telephone with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
During his campaigns, Yoon expressed on multiple occasions that he would place the highest priority on the South Korean alliance with the U.S. and would also try to reach out to Japan before looking at China.
It would be an important shift in South Korea's foreign policy from the Moon Jae-in administration. Moon tried to keep South Korea non-committal to the Quad although it agreed with the goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
South Korea has so far tried to convince the U.S. that it would work for the goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy through its New Southern Policy.
The Quad is an informal network among the U.S., Japan, Australia and India to contain China in the Indo-Pacific though it does not officially name China and rather claims that its goal is a "free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific."
In the two summit meetings of the Quad leaders in May 2021 and September 2021, South Korea kept itself away even though there were reports that the U.S. wanted otherwise. South Korea's position to avoid the Quad appears to be part of its well-thought-out policy.
For South Korea, the Quad is a security dialogue and the South joining it would lead to repercussions. More specifically, China would be unhappy with such move and which would lead to economic consequences for Seoul.
It's important to note that almost 60-70 percent of South Korea's GDP consists of external trade in which China's share is almost 20-25 percent. China is also important for South Korea in dealing with North Korea.
Contrary to the Quad formation, South Korea is an eager participant in the Quad+ mechanism which focuses on dealing with the economic and health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Actually, it is interesting to note that the joint statements issued after the Quad summit meetings talk more about infrastructure, climate, cybersecurity, technology, health, vaccines and supply chains than security issues.
It means that the Quad and the Quad+ are getting closer to each other. Thus, South Korea is right in its approach to wait and watch rather than jumping the gun.
South Korea is also aware that the Quad is a work in progress. Even among the four main players of the Quad, multilateral security content is very thin so far. Furthermore, all of these countries have been inconsistent in their approach toward China in the last few years.
For example, Japan, which was one of the main proponents of an Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China, has dropped the word "strategy" and has instead used the word "vision" in recent years.
Similarly, India, which was one of the reluctant players in the Quad, has become more overt and active in its participation after its border clash with China since mid-2020. In such a context, South Korea has rightly decided to wait and watch and postpone joining the Quad
The Indo-Pacific strategies of the Quad countries are gradually interacting and adjusting with the initiatives of other players in the region. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy documents talk about "ASEAN centrality," the ASEAN framework for Indo-Pacific and few European countries' approaches toward the Indo-Pacific have been intersecting with one another.
Thus, South Korea is also right in saying that it would prefers to pursue its similar goal in the region through its New Southern Policy.
Another important aspect of the Quad is that until now, quadrilateral security understanding and agreement among the four countries are still largely nonexistent. Rather, these four countries have been trying to substantially increase their bilateral security and strategic cooperation.
For example, India has signed a military intelligence sharing agreement, logistic exchanges and communication compatibility agreements with the U.S. South Korea also has similar agreements with the U.S., and other Quad countries and it may have more of these agreements in the future without formally being part of the Quad.
Last but not the least, it must be stressed that South Korea is a security ally of the U.S. and in any dire situation, it would have entry into the Quad calculus via the U.S.
South Korea's decision to work for the goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy through its New Southern Policy, bilateral security agreements with the Quad countries and its security alliance with the U.S. appears to be a wise strategy in comparison to formally joining the Quad and annoying China.
If the Yoon administration decides after coming to power to formally join the Quad, it needs to first evaluate the cost of the policy change and whether South Korea is ready to pay it.
The new administration must keep in mind that clarity and consistency of foreign policy may be lauded by people, but they are not necessarily good for the national interests of the country.
The author (sandipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.
