The fragmented global response to the war in Ukraine shows that while the U.S. and its allies see policies as rooted in efforts to preserve the liberal international order (LIO), many emerging countries see them differently.

The emerging countries see it as part of an effort by a small number of countries to preserve their own decades-old advantages at the expense of a large part of the world's population.

India's Foreign Minister S. Jalshankar said that, "Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe's problems are the world's problems but the world's problems are not Europe's problem."

Leaders of many of these emerging countries believe that too little attention is paid to the fact that many former colonies have become increasingly powerful nations in their own right.

"We refuse to be the pawn in a new Cold War," Indonesian President Joko Widodo said in November 2022. His views are shared in some form or another by many leaders of these emerging countries.

In the next two decades, these emerging countries will climb the ranks of the world's largest economies and populations, reshaping the structure of world politics in the process.

Washington and its allies should accept that not only are these countries emerging, but also that as they grow, they will not align with Washington on many international issues.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many of these countries declined to support Ukraine, refusing to take concrete action with regard to sanctions on Russia or weapons for Kyiv.

On a visit to Beijing in 2023, Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva pledged to work with China to "balance world geopolitics" — a phrase that implied upending American global primacy.

Even India, which sees China as an adversary and has grown much closer to the United States in recent years, is unlikely to back the U.S. militarily in the event of a war over Taiwan.

In the main, the grievances of emerging countries revolve around their perception that they are being excluded from the main decision-making structures and the global international institutions which make up the LIO.

Thus, there needs to be more emphasis on joint problem-solving and reform of institutional structures which allows more space for diplomatic cooperation with the emerging countries.

The emphasis needs to be on solving problems together, finding new roads into the future which include the emerging countries rather than telling them to simply follow the rules of the LIO.

Above all, it is important to earn the trust of the emerging countries and to make them feel that they are truly part of the LIO.

Fortunately, emerging countries don't want to be vassals of China anymore than they want to be vassals of America. They are not swing states ready to pick sides in a new Cold War.

In fact, they actively seek a more fluid and multipolar world, one in which they believe they will have more leverage and freedom to maneuver. Many maintain closer ties with the United States than China.

But even when progress on common interests are made, the emerging countries will also maintain relationships with U.S. adversaries. And particularly concerning is the rise of the so-called Axis of Four — China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing their spheres of influence, and they want Washington's minimal presence in their respective regions.

They reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West's championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and promote domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define their own democracy.

They do not believe that the West will accept their rise to power on the world stage. They oppose outside meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances and the use of coercive sanctions.

The Axis of Four does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The shared opposition to the present order's core principles and their determination to bring about change are a powerful foundation for collective action.

Strong relations among the Axis of Four have emboldened Pyongyang. North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned his country's traditional policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, engaging in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, expressing it has no interest in dialogue.

The Axis represents a new center of gravity, where other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn.

Wars arise from certain conditions, such as territorial disputes, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to regime survival. And the likelihood of war increases when there are competing orders.

The United States will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should actively promote the attractions of the existing LIO and persuade the emerging countries how it can be made better.

The Axis nations are united in their opposition to the LIO and its U.S. leadership, and is determined to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War.

The United States and its partners must acknowledge this Axis as the most dangerous challenge to the LIO. They must reinforce and improve the foundations of the existing international order and push back against those attempting to undermine it.

It may be impossible to stop the emergence of the new Axis, but keeping it from upending the current LIO is an achievable goal.

Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com), a former lawmaker, is chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project and a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.