According to Cheong Wa Dae, Xi said, "China has maintained a blood alliance with North Korea. There have been many changes, yet the relationship has not changed fundamentally."
The Chinese side, through an unofficial channel, refuted Xi's use of the word "blood alliance" (xue meng). There is no official Chinese transcript released to fact-check Xi's words in the meeting.
In general, the Chinese government today does not refer to the Sino-North Korea relationship as "xue meng." What the Chinese commonly use, instead, is "xian xue ning cheng." It means a relationship "formed through fresh blood." The common Korean translation for it is "dong maeng," which literally means "blood alliance." So, even if Xi didn't use the word "blood alliance," it would mean "blood alliance," when translated into Korean.
Semantics aside, the important question is whether the nature of today's relationship between China and North Korea, in this 21st century, can still be defined as an "alliance" or not. The resounding answer is yes.
Above all, China and North Korea have still kept their formal alliance since 1961. Despite reports that Beijing's patience with Pyongyang has reached its limit, China has never officially proposed to abolish or abandon its alliance with North Korea. After North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013, for instance, Deng Yuwen, then the deputy editor of Study Times, the journal of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, wrote a column for the Financial Times, titled "China should abandon North Korea." It was soon found that Deng was fired by the Communist Party organ. A Chinese academic in Beijing observed: "Deng asserted that we should abandon North Korea, but it was him who was abandoned.
Some argue that the North Korea-China Alliance treaty was a mere Cold War relic; its applicability in the post-Cold War era is virtually non-existent. But using the same logic, we can also ask why, even after the demise of the Cold War, China did not rescind its alliance with North Korea? This is a salient question because China abolished its alliance with the Soviet Union after it reached the treaty expiration period of 30 years. China and Russia are still not allies today. Even a prominent figure such as Fu Ying, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's Congress, recently affirmed that the two are not allies. But China is very careful in choosing words when it comes to North Korea affairs
So, we are back to page one. Why does China, which has a formal alliance with North Korea, want to avoid using the very word in public and make pains not to draw attention to it? The obvious answer is that the propaganda department of the Communist Party banned the word in the Chinese media, by putting it on the list of prohibited words.
Since the reform and opening up of the country in 1978, China's foreign policy has emphasized the principle of "non-alliance" as its core of "independence diplomacy." The China-North Korea alliance is an anomaly. It directly goes against the very central tenet of the Chinese foreign policy. So, Beijing has reason not to highlight it. The Chinese alliance treaty with North Korea is still alive "quietly" unless the media pay attention to it.
In addition, China, which self-styles itself as a "responsible great power" (fu zeren de daguo), wants to avoid taking responsibility in dealing with North Korea amid the heightened "China accountability" of North Korea in the international narrative. Furthermore, it may be beneath the dignity of the "great country" to be found to be a "close buddy" of the international pariah.
China has been struggling to de-emphasize that its supreme leader did not use the word "blood alliance" in describing Beijing's ties with Pyongyang. The best way to dissipate the controversy is for China to demonstrate with its actions, not words, that North Korea is not its ally.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Reach him at sunnybbsfs@gmail.com