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By Andrew Hammond
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Biden and his new administration are in the throes of a comprehensive Afghan policy review over how best to end Washington's 20-year engagement in the country, the nation's longest ever running involvement in a military conflict. Biden will report before the May 1 deadline to withdraw all foreign forces set in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement brokered by the Trump team.
In advance, NATO ― which took control of international security operations in Afghanistan in 2003 ― met Feb. 18 to discuss its own presence in the troubled country in what is also the military alliance's longest, costliest, and most ambitious operation ever. At the meeting, NATO defense ministers effectively pushed back a decision on the May 1 deadline to wait for Biden's review to try to ensure alignment with Washington.
It is plausible that the final call on NATO's operation post-May will not come until after the organization's foreign ministers meet in mid-March. And to try to "buy time" before then, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg urged the Afghan government and the Taliban to step up in coming weeks the pace of reconciliation talks.
NATO now has around 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, helping to train and advise the nation's security forces. Most are not now U.S. personnel, but the wider troop contingent could not continue if U.S. transport, logistics and other support were withdrawn.
The Biden review of the peace deal, which involves withdrawal of foreign forces in exchange for security guarantees by the Taliban, comes as Afghanistan stands at a critical crossroads. The peace deal has been violated repeatedly with growing concerns that levels of violence are still too high to justify a total pull-out of foreign forces.
While the peace process with the Taliban may offer the best hope for a sustained peace for decades, many in Afghanistan are understandably anxious about their collective futures. While fragile gains have been made since 2001, the country faces a daunting array of economic, security, and political risks.
The biggest challenge may remain the country's internal security situation, despite pledges that are made by Taliban militants. This increase in disorder comes after Afghan authorities have released thousands of Taliban prisoners promised in last year's deal.
In this context, fears have been repeatedly raised that, should the security situation deteriorate much further in coming months, this U.S. and NATO foreign force (now a tiny fraction of the previously 150,000-strong combat presence) is not big enough. This footprint also remains key for ensuring training and cohesion for the several hundred thousand strong Afghan police and military personnel ― which have day-to-day responsibility for security in the country ― which may otherwise disintegrate.
On the economic front, the news is not good either. Reconstruction has been slow, unemployment remains very high, and over a million Afghans are internally displaced in the country, with millions more refugees believed to be in Pakistan and Iran. And this, despite estimations that Washington has spent more on Afghan reconstruction than the cost of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after the Second World War.
It is also clear that, since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the economy has not been diversified enough from drug exports such as opium and heroin. This despite the fact that the country has abundant natural resources ― gas, minerals and oil ― with an estimated value of some 3 trillion dollars.
However, in the midst of this difficult picture, there remains some cause for optimism, especially if a sustainable peace deal can be agreed with the Taliban. Take the example of the country's fledgling democracy.
The country's national unity government has survived more than seven years since first formed in 2014. Its creation represented the first democratic transfer of power in the country's history following President Hamid Karzai's post 9/11 administration. While there have been significant tensions, the national unity government has helped consolidate the legitimacy of the new post-Taliban political system.
Other gains include Afghanistan's accession to the World Trade Organization and wider moves to revive economic links with the outside world, including the modern Silk Road, a new rail route connecting the country to China and Central Asia. Meanwhile, there are more children, including millions of girls, enrolled at schools; greater recognition of women's rights, and spread of technologies such as the internet and cell phones across the country.
Yet, these potentially reversible gains remain in jeopardy at the historic crossroads the country is now at, depending upon the outcome of the intra-Afghan peace process. While a sustainable peace breakthrough remains possible subject to Taliban acquiescence, there is a growing prospect of intensified political, security and economic instability if the reconciliation process breaks down plunging the country into new uncertainty.
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
