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| Korea National Diplomatic Academy Chancellor Kim Joon-hyung speaks during an interview with The Korea Times in his office in Seoul, Dec. 15. / Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk |
The Korea Times conducted interviews with six Korean and foreign experts on how the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations will develop on the occasion of the inauguration of the Joe Biden administration. They were Korea National Diplomatic Academy Chancellor Kim Joon-hyung, former Deputy Foreign Minister Shin Kak-soo, Wilson Center's Asia Program fellow Cheong Seong-chang, former six-party talks U.S. special envoy Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. nuclear negotiator Robert Gallucci and Center for the National Interest Senior Director of Korean Studies Harry Kazianis. ― ED.
Q: What do you think of the idea of President-elect Biden picking up some of President Donald Trump's approaches toward North Korea? Do you agree with the face-to-face diplomacy that Trump used with Pyongyang?
DeTrani: I would recommend that the Biden administration embrace and build on the June 18 Declaration between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. The declaration succinctly articulates the need to transform bilateral relations, end the Korean War and pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in addition to repatriation of the troops killed during the Korean War. Those are the core objectives to what we pursued in 26 years of negotiations with North Korea. I would also recommend that senior officers first meet to determine if North Korea and the U.S. are still committed to this declaration. If they are, then working-level senior talks can be scheduled to craft a generic roadmap for accomplishing these goals. With that, I would be supportive of President Biden meeting with Chairman Kim, to memorialize the declaration.
Kazianis: If Joe Biden did make peace building with North Korea a priority ― a big if considering the COVID-19 and accompanying economic crisis he will face ― the new administration should simply build on what Trump has done. In fact, Biden could signal that right now to North Korea in a simple statement or quote that he will not tear down what can only be described as a peaceful coexistence created by Trump between Washington and Pyongyang. Biden could then state that he would be open to a summit that tries to take reasonable and achievable steps forward to build on what has been accomplished, such as a meaningful first step toward North Korea doing something to at least limit the growth of their nuclear arsenal exchange for some sanctions relief.
Kim: Many believe that Biden should try to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue based on what has been accomplished by Trump. Trump's biggest contribution to the Korean Peninsula is he has raised the priority of the matter in the pecking order of U.S. foreign policy because it was regarded as critical but not urgent under previous administrations. In addition, he picked up an ideal approach in dealing with North Korea, top-down diplomacy, given that only Kim has the authority to negotiate about denuclearization issues. Plus, he has lowered the bar for a summit with the North and it is no longer a historic event. Thanks to such contributions, the North and the U.S. could agree to the Singapore Joint Statement ― and the North has not conducted any long-range missile or nuclear tests since Trump and Kim first met in June 2018, which is admirable for Trump. Given what Trump has done over the last four years, Biden needs to honor the joint statement, which would serve as a good signal to the North.
Gallucci: It is my hope that the Biden administration works to develop a dialogue with the DPRK that evolves into serious negotiations. This may build on some of what has been accomplished over the last four years, but I would not expect summitry to be the model for the new president's engagement with the North.
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| Former Deputy Foreign Minister Shin Kak-soo speaks during an interview with The Korea Times in Seoul, Dec. 18. / Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk |
Q: What do you think of the idea that North Korea and the U.S. taking reciprocal steps instead of the U.S.' denuclearization-first approach? Or can you suggest a better solution?
Cheong: Realistically, a synchronized and phased approach to eliminating North Korea's nuclear program is the sole means and it must be followed by corresponding measures from the U.S. To the Kim Jong-un regime, its nuclear weapons are more like regime survival. In that respect, it is hard to expect the North to agree to dismantle its nuclear program in a short period of time, so we are required to pursue North Korean denuclearization over the long haul, incrementally. In addition, when the denuclearization process makes progress, the international community has to take corresponding steps for further advancement. Plus, reconciliation between the North and the U.S. needs to be in lockstep with the denuclearization progress, such as normalizing bilateral relations when it achieves 50 percent completion.
Gallucci: I would hope that, in the course of working-level discussions between the U.S. and the DPRK, they would see the clear advantage to both countries of normalizing relations. The U.S. and the international community's interest in seeing North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and return to the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) is also clear. But no one should expect this to happen very quickly for both technical and political reasons. Steps by the U.S. and the North to reduce tension and increase their investment in the process of normalization will be necessary, and quite likely will have to be linked together in some kind of reciprocal process.
Shin: An all-in-one approach is desirable, but North Korea has yet to make it clear that it will give up its nuclear program and is on the verge of completing its denuclearization, meaning that a package deal is impractical. Despite taking incremental steps, it is necessary to minimize the phases and closely forge a roadmap with the U.S. to achieve the end goal of denuclearization.
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| Joseph DeTrani, a former U.S. special envoy to the six-party talks / Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk |
Q: The Moon Jae-in administration is expected to try and persuade the Biden administration to reduce sanctions against North Korea in a bid to revive the stalled nuclear talks between the U.S. and the North. Do you believe it is a good idea to bring the North back to the negotiating table and do you think if it will work if the U.S. eases sanctions?
Gallucci: Neither the U.S. nor the rest of the international community should have any enthusiasm for sanctions. They may at times be necessary, but they represent the failure to achieve desired outcomes by negotiations. I think the new administration could show some flexibility in the application of sanctions without showing weakness.
Kim: As Biden said he would meet Kim Jong-un if he agrees to draw down his nuclear capacity, President Moon Jae-in has insisted that the international community ease sanctions on the North if the country makes meaningful progress in realizing the goal of denuclearization, such as partially lifting sanctions in exchange for the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear complex or fully easing sanctions in reward for complete denuclearization. Moon has been under fire for calling for an unconditional easing of sanctions against the North, but that is a falsehood that was spread by U.S. hardliners.
DeTrani: North Korea should return to negotiations with the U.S. because it is in their interest to negotiate a settlement with the U.S. ― and others, also. The North returning to negotiations shouldn't be conditioned on easing sanctions or providing any other deliverable. If during negotiations sanctions are eased, fine, but as a result of negotiations, not a price to be paid to get North Korea to return to negotiations.
Shin: Sanctions are the leverage that will move North Korea toward denuclearization, so lifting them should be in lockstep with progress in the denuclearization process. Pyongyang's agreement to a phased approach would lead to the international community's corresponding easing of sanctions, thereby giving South Korea elbow room in inter-Korean relations, so Seoul needs to closely consult with Washington on the entire process of denuclearization.
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| Cheong Seong-chang, a fellow at the Wilson Center's Asia Program / Courtesy of Cheong Seong-chang |
Q: Some are concerned that the North Korea issue may not be high on the agenda, with the Biden administration likely to focus more on domestic issues, climate change and the Iran nuclear deal. In addition, it is expected to take a long time for the Biden team to develop its North Korea policy, with Seoul reportedly lobbying for Washington to appoint a special envoy for policy toward Pyongyang. What do you think of the expectations?
Shin: Along with domestic issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, economic crisis and racial divisions, the Iran nuclear deal is highly anticipated to take precedence over the North Korean nuclear negotiations under the Biden team. Despite understanding that the North Korean nuclear program is critical, the Iran nuclear deal was one of the former Barack Obama administration's biggest diplomatic feats, but was abandoned by President Trump. In order to make the North Korea issue run in tandem with the Iranian one under the Biden team, the South Korean government needs to ask the U.S. to appoint a "North Korea czar" in charge of coordinating policy toward Pyongyang as it is considering an "Asian czar" to focus on issues involving China. The czar would be more empowered than a special envoy in handling the nuclear issue.
Kazianis: Biden will indeed be pressed for any time to dedicate to North Korea ― his plate is filled with crisis after crisis with no guarantee that any time or attention given to the issue will achieve anything, that is just a fact. However, Biden could appoint a U.S. special envoy that does not report to the secretary of state, but is a special assistant to President Biden and reports to Biden directly. That could be a powerful signal that Biden is really serious about negotiating something transformative with Pyongyang. When you know you are talking to someone who reports directly to the most powerful person on the planet, that means something.
Cheong: It remains to be seen if Biden will appoint a North Korea special envoy before he takes office in January. In addition, the special envoy should be an influential figure who receives bipartisan support. In that sense, with Biden likely to focus on the virus crisis, it may be wise for Seoul to persuade Washington to entrust Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to act as the administration's No. 2 in high-level talks with the North Korean leader's sister Kim Yo-jong, who is in charge of policy toward South Korea and the U.S. Such talks may be able to forge major and substantial compromise between the two sides on what is a really difficult problem to solve.
DeTrani: President-elect Biden knows the North Korea issue better than any of his predecessors. His years in the Senate and with the Foreign Affairs Committee, and as vice president, makes him very conversant on all issues related to North Korea. Also, his designated secretary of state and national security adviser know this issue well. So, I believe North Korea will be high on his list of foreign affairs priorities and he'll probably quickly convene his Cabinet to draft a strategy for dealing with this issue.
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| Center for the National Interest Senior Director of Korean Studies Harry Kazianis / Korea Times file |
Kim: So far, the six-party talks have been described as dead, but in the wake of the Biden election, they have been brought back to life, as first and foremost the president-elect promised to make multilateral solutions a pillar of U.S. foreign policy, and the North Korea issue is one in three areas, on which the U.S. can cooperate with China which can exert its influence on the North. However, ditching bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and the North and returning to the six-party talks is not a good idea. They could serve as a supplementary tool for the North's denuclearization because multiple participating countries can guarantee any agreements if they reach a non-aggression or peace treaty in the six-party talks, which is favorable to the North. Also, what I want is to make the multilateral forum a minister- or even president-level negotiation, which I believe could be more effective.
DeTrani: I'm a supporter of the six-party talks, having worked with this multilateral group of nations that, in fact, succeeded in getting North Korea to sign the Joint Statement of 2005, that committed North Korea to dismantle all nuclear weapons and facilities. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula affects more than the U.S. Obviously, it affects the ROK profoundly, while also affecting Japan, China and Russia ― thus my support of a multilateral approach in re-engaging with North Korea.
Cheong: Chinese cooperation is the biggest issue in the North Korean denuclearization process. If the U.S. government is unable to get active cooperation from China on the North Korean nuclear issue, it will struggle to succeed in negotiations with the North, regardless of proposals it puts on the table. Summits and working-level talks involving the U.S. China, and the two Koreas through a "four-party talks" framework are essential to ensuring that China is actively involved in the process of denuclearization. If four-party talks are held, a comprehensive range of issues, including denuclearization, a peace treaty, regime security for the North, sanctions relief and normalizing relations between Washington and Pyongyang, can all be discussed. If four-party talks begin and should they result in real progress, then time will come to expand them further to include Russia and Japan in a reconstituted six-party talk framework.
Kazianis: If we want to have a North Korea with more powerful and larger amounts of nuclear weapons, then sure, six-party talks are great. North Korea knows how to play off the different parties against each other and I don't see any way we can achieve at least something close to arms control with Pyongyang in such a format. My advice would be to have direct U.S.-DPRK talks with ROK-DPRK talks as soon as possible. However, institutionalizing such talks in a formal six-party sort of manner will just allow the Kim regime to stall for time, break the sanctions regime even more than it has now and get us nowhere. History tells us six-party talks are just a massive time suck; we need to learn from our mistakes and stop repeating them.
Gallucci: I think that U.S.-North Korean direct engagement is essential to resolving security issues in Northeast Asia. But I do not think a durable resolution to those issues is possible without taking account of the interests of Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing.
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| Robert Gallucci, a former U.S. nuclear negotiator / Courtesy of Robert Gallucci |
Shin: Since the collapse of its Hanoi summit with the U.S., North Korea has ignored South Korea's calls for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation intentionally ― a strategy that has been getting a nervous Moon administration to persuade Washington to hold talks with Pyongyang for an easing of sanctions. However, when things do not go its way, the North gives the cold shoulder to the South. In that sense, we are required to remain calm and patient rather than repeatedly calling for inter-Korean cooperation. For the time being, we need to adopt "strategic patience" toward the North. It is amateurish to believe that our goodwill will elicit the same from the North.
Cheong: With North Korea keeping its border with China closed due to COVID-19, it is naive to expect the North to return to inter-Korean dialogue upon South Korea's call. Therefore, South Korea needs to wait and see until the North assuages its concerns over the virus, rather than begging for inter-Korean talks. In addition, it is also important for the South Korean government to strengthen communication and coordination on the U.S.' North Korea policy in order to help the Biden administration adopt a pragmatic approach toward the North. Plus, Seoul needs to enhance strategic dialogue with China about North Korean denuclearization.
Kazianis: North Korea, at least for now, knows that what it wants in terms of sanctions relief and regime legitimization can only come from the United States. That is why the Kim regime is so focused on talking with Washington, as Washington is key to ending this 70-year on-and-off crisis. Seoul can help in trying to bring the parties together as well as offering to support Washington's efforts by trying to bring forward inter-Korean economic projects that can revitalize North Korea, but U.S.-DPRK talks are the key.
DeTrani: I believe inter-Korean talks are necessary and possible. The Panmunjeom Declaration of 2018 between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un is something that should be pursued; it's also indicative of the North's willingness to work directly with the South, as they have done often in the past. In fact, the U.S. should encourage South Korea to re-engage with the North and reconstitute visits of separated families and visits to Mount Geumgang, while exploring the re-establishment of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, once North Korea rebuilds the liaison office they demolished.
Q: Do you believe Kim will stage a military provocation before Biden's inauguration on Jan. 20?
Kim: I am convinced that North Korea will not stage a military provocation ahead of the Biden inauguration and will even remain quiet until the end of the first half of next year when the next U.S. administration is expected to complete a review of its policy toward Pyongyang. Unless there is a bad signal from Washington, the North is likely to refrain from testing a nuclear device or launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), both of which are game changers that may get the U.S. to adopt a tougher stance against the North.
Kazianis: I see no reason why Kim would do anything to get the Biden camp upset or want to turn away from talks with North Korea ― no ICBM or nuclear test is worth such a risk. Why would Biden want to use any of his limited time or space internationally when North Korea at that point looks like it wants to create trouble? North Korea would make the gravest of mistakes in creating a crisis, as Joe Biden would have every incentive to just try and apply more pressure and focus on the historic amount of issues he will need to tackle. Kim should think very, very carefully, as his regime is already facing economic challenges that are mounting every day, that he is not able to trade at all with China or the outside world thanks to his self-imposed COVID-19 blockade. How much more pressure can North Korea take?
Shin: North Korea has historically launched missile or nuclear provocations before and after the U.S. presidential election, but the current challenges ― sanctions, natural disasters and COVID-19 ― that the country is facing will prevent it from doing that again. Also, they know its provocation will lead to tougher sanctions from the U.S. and the international community, which will make its situation worse. In addition, China does not want to see ramped-up tensions between the North and the U.S., so Beijing may play a certain role in discouraging the North's possible provocative actions. I assume that China may have pressured the North last June to suspend a military action against South Korea when Kim Yo-jong vowed retaliation for the South's "failure" to stop anti-North leaflets sent by North Korean defectors and activists across the border.
Q: Do you believe the Tokyo Olympics will be a "golden time" for any improvements in inter-Korean and Washington-Pyongyang relations, with heads of relevant nations having a chance to meet there?
DeTrani: I believe the golden time will be once the Biden administration is sworn in on Jan. 20. There is no reason to wait for the summer of 2021 and hope that the Olympics will be the venue for re-engagement with North Korea. There were two summit meetings between Trump and Kim in 2018 and 2019, and a DMZ encounter, also. There were three meetings of Moon Jae-in and Kim during that time, and four meetings between Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping and one with Russian President Vladimir Putin. I think there has been a sufficient number of leadership meetings with Kim, thus no reason to hope for an encounter at the 2021 Summer Olympics. We're past that. If North Korea is serious, as the U.S. and others are, in resolving issues with North Korea and resuming negotiations, the time to meet is soon after Jan. 20, 2021.
Kazianis: I don't really see this being a major reason why all sides would want to get together, unless the U.S. and South Korea were worried Kim would start a crisis. These aren't an Olympics in South Korea, so there is less reason for them to provide a spark for peace. Plus, COVID-19 means they might not even occur. However, if tensions are already running high and Kim has already started a crisis, this could just add more fuel to the fire ― with Kim perhaps using the occasion to test an ICBM or bigger hydrogen bomb.
Kim: The Tokyo Summer Olympics could serve as momentum for an advancement in inter-Korean ties, just as the PyeongChang Olympics were a turning point in relations, although it is still questionable whether the Games will be able to take place as scheduled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. After the Tokyo Games, China will host the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing and the Asian Games are also scheduled to be held in Hangzhou, China, also in 2022, so we will be able to link the agenda of "Peace Olympics" to those events as well. In addition, should the two Koreas jointly hold the 2032 Summer Olympics, it would be significant.
